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FORECLOSURE ALTERNATIVES (“HAFA”) 
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Jesse Soslow* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In light of the recent and ongoing economic crisis, which has led to a 
surge in defaulted mortgages, as well as the recent controversy over the 
foreclosure practices of large mortgage holders, this comment will examine 
an alternative device to foreclosure:  the deed-in-lieu of foreclosure 
(“DIL”).  In particular, this comment will address the potential benefits and 
pitfalls of using the DIL device to mortgagees, mortgagors, and broader 
communities, as well as the economy generally.  The comment will then 
examine the government’s current incentive program, the Home Affordable 
Foreclosure Alternatives Program (“HAFA”), and the use of DIL 
transactions as part of that program.  Finally, the comment proposes 
changes to make HAFA more effective and consistent with its stated goals. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
With the recent rise in mortgage defaults and resulting foreclosures, 
there has been substantial scholarship discussing the faults of, and potential 
cures for, foreclosure law.
1
  In order to address the issue of whether the 
DIL device can serve as a potential safety valve to the current system of 
foreclosure law, as well as better understand the nature of how DILs could 
serve that purpose, it is necessary to give brief background information 
regarding:  (1) the foreclosure law of the United States as it stands 
currently; (2) the economic and sub-prime mortgage crises; and (3) the 
 
*  Juris Doctor Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2012; Bachelor of 
Arts, University of Pennsylvania, 2007. 
 1. See generally Melissa Jacoby, The Value(s) of Foreclosure Law Reform, 37 PEPP. L. 
REV. 511 (2010) (discussing various recent proposals for foreclosure law reform). 
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recent foreclosure controversy affecting large mortgage lenders. 
A.  Foreclosure Law 
Although the law of foreclosure is very state-specific, there are two 
broad categories of procedures that foreclosures in the United States fall 
into:  (1) judicial foreclosure; and (2) non-judicial foreclosure under a 
power of sale.
2
 
Judicial foreclosure is available in every state, but is the primary 
method used in approximately forty percent of states.
3
  As the name 
suggests, judicial foreclosure requires a property to be sold through a court 
proceeding.
4
  The proceeding allows for procedural and substantive 
defenses to be considered by the court.
5
  If the court ultimately determines 
that the lender has the legal right to foreclose, then the court will grant a 
decree of foreclosure.
6
  Ordinarily, a sheriff or other public official who has 
been appointed by the court then conducts the actual sale.
7
 
Non-judicial foreclosure under a power of sale is the other main 
foreclosure method and is allowed in approximately sixty percent of states.
8
  
Under this method, once a mortgagor has defaulted, a mortgagee, after 
satisfying state-specific notice requirements, is entitled to exercise the 
“power of sale” clause contained in the mortgage (or deed of trust, as the 
security instrument is styled in many states).
9
  Once notice is provided, an 
auctioneer, a sheriff, or other public official generally conducts the 
foreclosure sale.
10
  A hearing is almost never provided in a power of sale 
foreclosure, unless the mortgagor files an affirmative action for an 
injunction.
11
 
As is likely apparent from its description, judicial foreclosure allows 
for an in-depth review prior to a foreclosure sale, and ensures strong 
protection for a borrower.  The flip side of this protection, however, is that 
 
 2. Cost and Time Factors in Foreclosure of Mortgages, 3 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 
413, 414 (1968). 
 3. GRANT NELSON & DALE WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW, § 7.11 (5th ed. 
2001). 
 4. JOHN RAO ET AL., FORECLOSURES: DEFENSES, WORKOUTS, AND MORTGAGE 
SERVICING, § 4.2.2 (3d ed. 2010). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, § 7.19. 
 9. RAO, supra note 4, § 4.2.3. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, § 7.19; RAO, supra note 4, § 4.2.3 
(stating that “to contest a foreclosure by power of sale, the homeowner must file an 
affirmative action and request an injunction to stop the sale.”). 
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judicial foreclosure is “complicated, costly and time-consuming.”
12
  Non-
judicial foreclosure can also suffer from those same defects, though 
certainly to a lesser extent.  In particular, non-judicial foreclosure can 
sometimes require substantial fees, lengthy delays, and redemption periods 
that are statutorily mandated.
13
 
B.  Mortgage Default and Foreclosure Crisis 
The home mortgage default and foreclosure crisis, which began in 
2007, has resulted in billions, if not trillions, of dollars in total losses to 
borrowers, lenders, communities, and the broader economy.
14
  The federal 
government has enacted a variety of measures to help assuage the damage 
from the crisis, as well as the pain felt by many individuals.
15
 
The effects of the crisis continue to be felt in this country, with still 
high rates of foreclosure and depressed housing markets.
16
  Further, there is 
little indication that the number of foreclosures will be returning to normal 
rates any time soon.
17
  This comment looks at whether DILs can serve to 
mitigate some of the ongoing negative effects of this crisis. 
C.  Foreclosure Controversy 
Beginning in early October 2010, large mortgage lenders such as 
GMAC, Bank of America, and JPMorgan Chase, halted foreclosures in 
states where judicial foreclosure proceedings are required.
18
  The freeze 
was a result of the revelation that large mortgage lenders were not properly 
filing and certifying documents in foreclosure proceedings.  In particular, at 
the heart of the controversy, is the use of “robo-signers” to sign affidavits 
and other documents that are necessary in foreclosure proceedings.
19
  The 
robo-signers—individuals whose sole job is to sign documents—would 
 
 12. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 3, § 7.11. 
 13. Cost and Time Factors in Foreclosure of Mortgages, supra note 2, at 414. 
 14. Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage 
Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1074 (2009). 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, OCC AND OTS MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT: 
DISCLOSURE OF NATIONAL BANK AND FEDERAL THRIFT MORTGAGE LOAN DATA, THIRD 
QUARTER 2010, at 42 (Dec. 2010), available at http://files.ots.treas.gov/490058.pdf 
(indicating the continually increasing number of completed foreclosures through September 
2010). 
 17. See id. (indicating the continually increasing number of completed foreclosures 
through September 2010). 
 18. See generally David Streitfeld, From a Maine House, a National Foreclosure 
Freeze, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2010, at A1 (describing the story behind the discovery of 
GMAC’s “robo-signing” practices and the resultant foreclosure freeze). 
 19. Id. 
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sign documents stating that they had personally reviewed the details of 
each case.
20
  These assertions, however, have ultimately turned out to be 
largely untrue.
21
  In fact, it would seem virtually impossible that a robo-
signer would be able to actually verify and review the details of each 
document, as some have stated that they sign in excess of 10,000 
documents per month.
22
 
While the mortgage foreclosure freeze that took place in October 2010 
was largely self-imposed by large mortgage lenders,
23
 there remains a 
looming likelihood that state courts will impose further restrictions.
24
  The 
use of robo-signers is a cost-saving method by large mortgage holders to 
decrease the administrative cost of foreclosure, particularly in judicial 
foreclosure states where costs are high.
25
  If state courts were to halt 
foreclosure proceedings or at least force reform of the current system used 
by large mortgage lenders, likely raising the costs of foreclosure, 
foreclosure alternatives would become more attractive to lenders.  The 
question then becomes whether the use of DILs, as an alternative device, 
should be further incentivized to make them a more widely used alternative 
to foreclosure, a question that will be addressed in a later section. 
An additional consideration that should be addressed is the impact of a 
foreclosure freeze on the wider economy.  While such a freeze may be the 
most sound method to protect consumers who received mortgages from 
these large lenders, the impact of the freeze would certainly have a 
substantial effect on the economy beyond any particular bank’s bottom 
line.
26
  Furthermore, the very uncertainty of a freeze (whether there will be 
one, how long one might last, and so on), in itself, could have negative 
economic ramifications.
27
  Such potential negative economic consequences 
strengthen the argument for the wide use of a robust foreclosure alternative 
such as DILs. 
 
 20. See Robbie Whelan, GMAC Spotlight on ‘Robo-Signer’, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 
2010, at C5 (reporting the details of the testimony of a particular GMAC-employed robo-
signer). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. David Streitfeld, Bank of America To Freeze Foreclosure Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
1, 2010, at B1. 
 24. See New Jersey Court May Order Foreclosure Freeze, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2010, 
at B6 (describing a possible foreclosure freeze imposed by the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey). 
 25. See supra Part II.A. 
 26. Mark Gongloff, Foreclosure Crisis Slams Into Banks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2010, at 
A1–A2 (outlining the broader economic effects of a foreclosure freeze, including the effect 
on the stock market). 
 27. See id. (discussing the negative economic impacts of uncertainty in the mortgage 
market). 
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III.  DEEDS-IN-LIEU 
Simply put, a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure is a device whereby a 
delinquent borrower will give a deed to a lender in exchange for the lender 
extinguishing all personal liability or for some other consideration.
28
  There 
are significant advantages to the borrower, the lender, the local court 
system, and the economy at large, from the consummation of this 
transaction, as opposed to proceeding through the foreclosure process.  
There is, however, potential for abuse that needs to be considered.  These 
issues will be discussed, in turn, below. 
A.  Advantages to Lender 
The advantages to lenders who use the DIL device instead of a 
foreclosure proceeding fall into three categories.  The first relates to the 
economic value of the home secured by the loan; the second relates to the 
administrative costs of the proceedings; and the third relates to the negative 
publicity of foreclosure proceedings.  Relating to the first category, with a 
DIL transaction, the lender can take control of the property immediately, 
and thus maintain the economic value of the property.
29
  With a foreclosure 
proceeding, there is potential for the property to be abandoned by the 
borrower at some point during the months-long (or, in some cases, years-
long) foreclosure process and, as a result, the property may decrease in 
value.  For the second category, the lender can quickly negotiate and 
consummate the transaction, saving the lender the high cost of foreclosure, 
which has been estimated at $50,000 per home (including the lender’s out 
of pocket costs and economic losses).
30
  Finally, for the third category, the 
lender can avoid the potential negative publicity of the foreclosure 
process.
31
  The reputation of foreclosing on peoples’ homes is naturally not 
good exposure for large lenders, and avoiding such a negative image is 
valuable. 
B.  Advantages to Borrower 
Like the advantages to the lender, where applicable, the borrower will 
have reciprocal advantages.  Further, there are additional advantages to a 
 
 28. John Murray, Deeds in Lieu of Foreclosure: Practical and Legal Considerations, 
26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 459, 460 (1991). 
 29. Id. at 461. 
 30. Id.; Desiree Hatcher, Foreclosure Alternatives: A Case for Preserving 
Homeownership, PROFITWISE NEWS AND VIEWS, Feb. 2006, at 2–5. 
 31. Murray, supra note 28, at 461; see also NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, § 6.18 
(outlining reasons for using deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure). 
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borrower that are not shared by the lender.  The borrower can obtain 
release of some or all of her personal liability under the mortgage 
indebtedness.
32
  The borrower, like the lender, can avoid the publicity, 
notoriety, time, and expense involved in foreclosure litigation that, on 
average, has been estimated to be $7200.
33
  Further, in some situations, the 
lender may agree to pay the transfer costs or make additional monetary 
payments to the borrower.
34
  Also, in some situations, the lender may grant 
the borrower some possessory interest in the property, such as the right to 
lease the property or the right to purchase it in the future.
35
  And finally, 
DIL “actions typically have less adverse impact than foreclosure on 
borrowers’ credit records.”
36
 
C.  Advantages to Local Court System 
With the sharp rise in foreclosures, court systems—particularly in 
judicial foreclosure states—have been inundated with foreclosure actions.
37
  
This influx of foreclosure actions has strained court systems to the point 
where multiple states have felt the need to enact programs in order to 
alleviate some of the burden.
38
  One type of program that has been 
implemented is required mediation.
39
  Under such a regime, borrowers and 
lenders are forced to meet with a mediator in order to (ideally) have the 
lender and borrower agree to either a loan modification or a short sale.
40
 
The success of these mediation programs, however, remains unclear.
41
  
 
 32. Murray, supra note 28, at 462. 
 33. Id., see also ANNA MORENO, COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE 
PREVENTION 4 (1995). 
 34. Murray, supra note 28, at 462. 
 35. Id. 
 36. OCC and OTS Mortgage Metrics Report, supra note 16, at 11. 
 37. See, e.g., Greg Allen, Mediation Courts May Ease Foreclosure Backlog, NPR, Apr. 
6, 2009 (describing the foreclosure problem as “a backlog that has overwhelmed the courts 
in many states”); see also David Streitfeld, New York Courts Vow Legal Aid in Housing, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011, at B4 (discussing New York’s rise in court foreclosure actions, 
particularly the 217% in the borough of Queens); Kimberly Miller, Foreclosure Mediators: 
Banks Pushed Us to Fail, PALM BEACH POST, Feb. 21, 2011 (“An estimated 350,615 
foreclosures clog Florida courts.”). 
 38. See Nat’l. Consumer Law Ctr., Summary of Programs, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mediation/summary-of-programs.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2012) (describing the 25 state mediation programs). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id.; see also Kimberly Miller, Florida Supreme Court Orders Mediators to be 
First Step in Foreclosure Cases, PALM BEACH POST, Dec. 28, 2009 (stating that the 
mediation program will be used to “discuss whether a loan modification or short sale is an 
option instead of foreclosure”). 
 41. See GEOFFRY WALSH, STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS: 
CAN THEY SAVE HOMES? 12–14 (Sept. 2009), available at 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mediation/report-state-mediation-
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In Florida, for instance, only six percent of the cases that have been 
referred to mediation have resulted in agreements, while the remaining 
ninety-four percent of cases have proceeded to court.
42
 
The advantage that the use of DIL transactions can serve in this 
situation is, of course, to remove foreclosure cases from the court system, 
allowing them to be resolved without draining the resources of state courts.  
Even assuming state mediation programs were successful, there would still 
be a strong argument for encouraging the use of DIL transactions in order 
to further alleviate the burden on the courts.  However, as mentioned 
above, there is a strong indication that these programs have not proved to 
be as successful as their advocates might have hoped in alleviating the 
strain on state courts.  This further bolsters the argument that an additional 
measure to alleviate the strain would be sound policy. 
D.  Economic Advantages of DILs 
In one sense, the economic advantages of DILs can be considered 
through the lens of the economic disadvantages, and costs, of foreclosure.  
Foregoing foreclosure often avoids these negative economic consequences.  
With regard to the broader economy, a foreclosure can impose high costs 
on the local government where a house is located, as well as on the value of 
the other homes in a foreclosed home’s neighborhood.
43
  If a home is 
abandoned prior to foreclosure, a local government could potentially lose 
$20,000 in lost property taxes, unpaid utility bills, property upkeep, 
sewage, and maintenance.
44
  Furthermore, studies have shown that a single-
family home foreclosure lowers the value of homes located within one-
eighth of a mile by an average of 0.9%.
45
  In addition to the monetary costs 
of foreclosure, there are also social costs.  For instance, increased 
foreclosures have been found to contribute to higher levels of violent 
crimes.
46
 
The negative impact of foreclosure on neighborhoods and local 
economies might not, of course, be entirely reversed by using an alternative 
to foreclosure, such as DILs.  Nevertheless, there are good reasons to 
believe that use of DILs would mitigate many of the negative economic 
consequences of foreclosure.  The negative impact of abandonment, for 
instance, would decrease in a collaborative DIL transaction between 
 
programs.pdf. 
 42. Miller, supra note 37. 
 43. U.S. S. J. ECONOMIC COMM, 110TH CONG., SHELTERING NEIGHBORHOODS FROM THE 
SUBPRIME FORECLOSURE STORM 15 (2007). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at n.48. 
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borrower and lender.  The depressive effect of foreclosure sales on other 
neighborhood properties could also be assuaged by the use of DIL 
transactions that allow for more flexibility in the ultimate sale of the home. 
E. Potentials for Abuse 
While the use of DILs has a variety of potential benefits, there remain 
certain pitfalls that must be considered.  These issues fall into three broad 
categories:  (1) legal issues that must be considered in order for a DIL 
transaction to withstand judicial scrutiny; (2) issues that a lender must 
consider in order for a DIL transaction to be worthwhile; and (3) 
protections for a borrower so that a DIL transaction is not ultimately used 
to the detriment of the borrower. 
Under the first category—legal issues that must be considered in order 
for a DIL transaction to withstand judicial scrutiny—there are two primary 
considerations.  First, the DIL must not be a “clog” on the mortgagor’s 
equity of redemption under applicable state law.
47
  And second, the DIL 
must not be construed to be an “equitable mortgage” that must be 
foreclosed by subsequent judicial action.
48
 
The doctrine of clogging a mortgagor’s equity of redemption arises 
from the common law principle that until a valid foreclosure decree has 
been issued, a mortgagor is entitled to “redeem” the property; that is, retain 
ownership by paying the indebtedness.
49
  Moreover, if the borrower fails to 
pay, she is entitled to have the property exposed to public sale, so that any 
value in excess of the mortgage debt may be realized and distributed to 
subordinate lien holders and the borrower.  A DIL quite clearly cuts off 
these mortgagor’s rights, and thus it has sometimes been called a “clog” on 
the mortgagor’s equity of redemption and been held impermissible.
50
  
However, John Murray suggests that an arms-length, fully documented DIL 
transaction will ordinarily survive a clogging challenge, because “a [DIL] 
is subsequent to the original mortgage . . . [,] it is a voluntary conveyance 
for independent and valuable consideration, and . . . it serves a socially 
useful purpose of allowing the mortgagor to avoid a time-consuming, 
costly, and public foreclosure, and possibly allow[s] the mortgagor to avoid 
personal liability on the debt . . . .”
51
 
The main clogging issue that arises with regard to DIL transactions—
which is intertwined with the issue of whether a DIL will be deemed an 
 
 47. PATRICK MEARS ET AL., STRATEGIES FOR SECURED CREDITORS IN WORKOUTS AND 
FORECLOSURES, § 4.08(b) (2004). 
 48. Id. 
 49. John Murray, Clogging Revisited, 33 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 279, 280 (1998). 
 50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 3.1 (1997). 
 51. Murray, supra note 49, at 287–88. 
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equitable mortgage—comes up generally in the scenario where a borrower, 
who is in default, asks the lender for an adjustment to her mortgage.  The 
lender will often agree, on the condition that a mechanism (such as a deed-
in-escrow) be put into place whereby title is transferred to the lender 
automatically if the borrower defaults again in the future, thus cutting off 
the borrower’s right (a) to insist upon a public sale and (b) to “redeem” the 
property by paying off the debt at any time until the auctioneer’s hammer 
falls (and, in some states, until many months after the sale has been 
completed).
52
  Courts are split on the issue of whether such transactions are 
generally valid.
53
 
The pertinent issue here is how these transactions should be treated in 
the home-mortgage context.  Would it be sound policy to uphold these 
transactions where a home lender and borrower have agreed to a mortgage 
adjustment on the condition that the borrower places a DIL in escrow?  The 
case law appears to distinguish the commercial and residential context on 
this issue,
54
 and for good reason.  It would seem likely that a residential 
borrower would often lack the sophistication and representation to be 
adequately protected in entering such an agreement.  This comment 
therefore does not argue that transactions involving placing a DIL in 
escrow should be used in the residential context.
55
  On the contrary, we are 
focusing on residential transactions in which the default has already 
occurred; there is no equity in the property; the borrower has no reasonable 
prospect of paying the loan and effectuating his right to redemption; and 
the DIL will be delivered absolutely and at once, rather than placed in 
escrow for delivery at some future time on a subsequent default. 
Even where clogging issues and equitable mortgage issues are not of 
concern, DILs are not “a universal panacea for mortgagees when the 
 
 52. Debra Stark, Avoiding the Recharacterization of Certain Deed-In-Lieu-of-
Foreclosure Transactions: Ensuring that What You Draft Is What You Get, 110 BANKING 
L.J. 330, 330 (1993). 
 53. See, e.g., Ringling Joint Venture II v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 595 So. 2d 180, 182 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding DIL in escrow to be valid and not a clogging of the right 
of redemption); Basile v. Erhal Holding Corp., 538 N.Y.S. 2d 831, 833 (holding that the 
deed transaction was a mortgage and thus invalid and unenforceable); see also First Ill. 
Bank v. Hans, 493 N.E. 2d 1171, 1174–75 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (ruling that a mortgage 
cannot require a mortgagor “to execute a quitclaim deed in lieu of foreclosure”); Kerr Land 
& Livestock, Inc. v. Glaus, 107 Idaho 767, 769 (App. 1984) (ruling that a deed of sale could 
not be considered a mortgage, subject to statutory foreclosure requirements). 
 54. See Ringling Joint Venture II, 595 So. 2d at 182 (“It is significant to us that . . . the 
transaction involves commercial real estate rather than residential property.”). 
 55. Deeds-in-escrow should be distinguished from the situation in which a lender, as 
part of the DIL transaction, agrees to give the borrower an option to purchase the property in 
the future, or allows the borrower to remain in the property and pay rent.  The primary 
distinction is that in such situations, it is assumed that better options for the borrower have 
already been ruled out prior to executing the DIL. 
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mortgagor has defaulted.”
56
  In fact, there are a number of circumstances 
that could, essentially, disqualify DILs as a viable option for lenders.  
These circumstances need to be considered in order to better understand an 
ideal incentive program that must take into consideration the real legal and 
economic consequences of using the DIL device instead of foreclosure (and 
vice-versa). 
One such concern is whether there are junior liens on the property.  
Under a typical foreclosure proceeding, junior liens are extinguished.
57
  The 
completion of a DIL transaction, however, does not extinguish junior 
liens.
58
  Thus if a lender wished to use the DIL device on a property with 
junior liens, it would be necessary to later foreclose on the property after 
the DIL transaction has taken place.
59
  In the context of this discussion, it 
would then appear counter-productive to employ the DIL device in 
circumstances where there are junior liens or judgments on the property.  
The point that is argued in this comment is that the DIL device can serve as 
an efficient and cost-saving method for both borrower and lender, and that 
it is ultimately beneficial for the economy and local communities.  In a 
situation in which it would be necessary to both use the DIL device and 
then foreclose on the property, it would appear that much of the benefit of 
the device would be lost.  In particular, consider that the foreclosure 
process itself, especially in judicial foreclosure states, would still remain a 
costly and time-consuming process for the lender.
60
  Further, the negative 
impact of foreclosure on the property’s surrounding community, as 
discussed above, would to some degree still persist.
61
  Even the benefit to 
the borrower would likely be diminished by the need for a future 
foreclosure, as that future cost would—at least to some degree—be passed 
on to her in any deal involving a DIL that might be struck between the 
borrower and the lender. 
Another issue that lenders must be concerned about when entering 
into a DIL transaction relates to the voluntariness of the transaction and 
adequacy of the consideration for the deed.  Courts inherently view the 
 
 56. MEARS, supra note 47, § 4.08(b). 
 57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 7.1 (1997) (“A valid 
foreclosure of a mortgage terminates all interests in the foreclosed real estate that are junior 
to the mortgage being foreclosed . . . .”). 
 58. MEARS, supra note 47, § 4.08(b). 
 59. See Murray, supra note 28, at 475 (noting that generally lenders do not accept DILs 
when there are subordinate liens or judgments on the property and that, if they do, it is 
important to structure the DIL transaction so as to avoid merging the lien with the title to the 
property).  For a lengthier discussion on the concept of merger, see NELSON & WHITMAN, 
supra note 3, § 6.15. 
 60. Of course, if a lender is foreclosing on a home to which it has a deed, it would be 
expected that the process would be less contentious and thus, on average, less costly and 
time-consuming.  Nevertheless, significant court costs and delays would still remain. 
 61. However, the problems flowing from abandonment likely would not persist. 
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borrower and lender as having disparate bargaining power, and thus will 
look closely at whether there was “undue influence, oppression, unfairness 
or unconscientious advantage.”
62
  If a court finds that the transaction was, 
in any of these ways, unfair, the transaction risks being overturned.  This 
issue, however, from the perspective of the lender, is not of primary 
concern in the context of this comment.  While it is certainly the case that 
an ideal DIL transaction will be robust under the light of judicial scrutiny, 
these particular concerns are more aptly considered in the following 
paragraph in the context of borrower protection.  In a program that 
encourages the use of DILs, it would seem unnecessary to have added 
protection to ensure the judicial upholding of the deal—relating particularly 
to the fairness of the deal to borrowers—if fairness to borrowers is already 
being assured through measures protecting borrowers’ interests. 
Borrower protection is perhaps the most important concern in the 
context of this comment relating to the use of DILs.  While lenders often 
have significant legal resources, as well as experience in this area, 
borrowers are far less likely to have equivalent resources and experience.  
This problem is further amplified by the fact that borrowers who have 
defaulted often lack the money to hire adequate legal counsel to aid in the 
execution of a DIL transaction.  The potential problems that need to be 
guarded against include:  (1) a borrower who, as a result of entering into a 
DIL agreement, foregoes a valid defense to foreclosure; (2) a borrower who 
receives inadequate consideration in the DIL transaction; and (3) a 
borrower who is unduly influenced into entering into the DIL transaction. 
Regarding the first problem, uninformed financially troubled 
borrowers, presented with the possibility of extinguishing all in personam 
debt through a DIL transaction, might agree to enter such a transaction 
despite the possibility of a valid defense to foreclosure.
63
  In the specific 
context of subprime mortgages, predatory lending is an ever-present theme.  
And since such predatory practices can serve as a basis for a defense to 
foreclosure,
64
 it would be undesirable to endorse a system that did not 
ensure all foreclosure defenses were exhausted or, at the very least, known 
to the borrower so to be used as leverage in workout negotiations. 
With regard to the problem of a borrower who receives inadequate 
consideration for a DIL transaction, a lender—as mentioned previously—is 
 
 62. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, § 6.19; see also Murray, supra note 28, at 463–
65 (discussing factors that may taint a transaction between a borrower and lender). 
 63. For a discussion of foreclosure defenses, see Martin C. Bryce, Jr., Foreclosure 
Developments, Mortgage Fraud, Counterclaims and Defenses, 64 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. 
REP. 4 (2010). 
 64. See Daniel Lindsey, Prevent People from Wrongfully Losing Their Homes, 21 CBA 
REC. No. 7, at 38 (2007) (discussing foreclosure defenses in the context of predatory loans in 
the state of Illinois). 
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very likely to have far greater experience in such transactions than a 
borrower.  Consequently, any deal that is struck has the potential to be, not 
a representation of the true bargaining power of the parties, but rather a 
reflection of the disparate knowledge of the circumstances.  Consider the 
following fact pattern as an illustration:  A borrower is in default on a 
recourse loan with an outstanding balance of $300,000, secured by a 
mortgage on a home worth $290,000.  Further, assume that, first, the 
foreclosure process would cost the lender $20,000 to complete and, second, 
the lender believes that, while it could likely obtain a deficiency judgment 
against the borrower, it knows that collecting the judgment would be 
unlikely.  The opportunity to extinguish the possibility of the deficiency 
judgment through a DIL transaction might be appealing to a borrower.  
Nevertheless, the opportunity of a better deal, unbeknownst to her, might 
exist.  In particular, the lender, it can be assumed, would gain $20,000
65
 by 
extinguishing the debt using the DIL transaction, some of which the 
borrower might be in a position to bargain for.  The point, it should be 
noted, is not that the borrower should be entitled to some of this excess 
$20,000, but rather that, in an ideal scenario, the borrower would be 
negotiating with the same knowledge that the lender has, and the ultimate 
agreement is merely a reflection of the parties’ relative bargaining power, 
rather than a reflection of asymmetric information. 
The final problem that must be considered, which is certainly 
compatible with—and not always separable from—the two problems 
discussed immediately above, is that of a borrower entering into a DIL 
transaction as a result of undue influence from a lender.  DIL transactions 
are considered “lender-friendly” agreements.
66
  Thus, it follows that, in 
certain instances, large institutional lenders with substantial legal 
representation and bargaining power could strong-arm borrowers into 
accepting DILs even though it may be to their disadvantage.  The possible 
ramifications of such an outcome could involve, as discussed above, a 
borrower’s acceptance of a DIL transaction that eliminates a viable 
foreclosure defense, or (especially if there is equity in the property) the 
acceptance of a deal that is substantially less than what she could have 
received had she not been unduly forced to accept the deal. 
Each of the three problems discussed could be largely solved by the 
presence of competent, knowledgeable counsel representing the borrower.  
With such representation, it would seem unlikely that a viable foreclosure 
 
 65. This assumes that the lender would not be able to recover a deficiency judgment 
against the borrower and thus would realize $270,000 through foreclosure ($290,000 on the 
sale minus $20,000 in costs) as opposed to $290,000 through the use of the DIL transaction. 
 66. See Andra C. Ghent & Marianna Kudlyak, Recourse and Residential Mortgage 
Default: Theory and Evidence from U.S. States (Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Working 
Paper No. 09-10R, 2010) (characterizing DILs as “lender-friendly procedure[s]”). 
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defense would be left either unused in a challenge to foreclosure or unused 
as leverage in bargaining for a DIL transaction.  Furthermore, a competent 
and knowledgeable attorney would have full knowledge of the situation 
and thus bargain on a level with less asymmetric information than her 
client might on her own.  And, lastly, a borrower’s counsel would zealously 
defend the borrower’s interests, ensuring that the borrower is not forced 
into a DIL transaction that is not in her best interest.  Of course, the idea of 
ensuring legal representation in these matters is not a groundbreaking 
notion.  The question then becomes how to ensure that result.  This 
question will be addressed in the section below on the proposed incentive 
program.
67
 
IV.  CURRENT INCENTIVE PROGRAM—HOME AFFORDABLE FORECLOSURE 
ALTERNATIVES (HAFA) PROGRAM 
The Federal Government currently has a program in place to 
incentivize the use of DILs in certain circumstances.  The program is 
known as the Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives Program 
(“HAFA”) and is part of the expanded Home Affordable Modification 
Program (“HAMP”).
68
  Under HAFA, the U.S. Department of the Treasury 
gives incentive payments to borrowers, mortgage servicers, and investors 
for the use of short sales
69
 or DIL transactions when other modification 
options have been exhausted and a variety of other requirements are met.
70
 
In order to be eligible for the HAFA program, a borrower must meet 
the basic eligibility requirements of HAMP.
71
  The borrower must show 
 
 67. See infra Part V. 
 68. The U.S. Department of the Treasury established HAMP under the Making Home 
Affordable Program, which was established through the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of 2008.  See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 
109, 122 Stat. 3765, 3774–75 (2008) (directing that:  
the Secretary [of the Treasury] shall implement a plan that seeks to maximize 
assistance for homeowners and use the authority of the Secretary to encourage 
the servicers of the underlying mortgages, considering net present value to the 
taxpayer, to take advantage of the HOPE for Homeowners Program . . . or other 
available programs to minimize foreclosures 
).  See also U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL 
YEAR 2010 209–10 (Nov. 15, 2010) (describing HAFA as being included in HAMP, which, 
in turn, is part of MHA, which is part of TARP). 
 69. Under the HAFA short sale program, “servicer[s] allow . . . the borrower to sell the 
property for less than the total amount due on the mortgage.  The servicer will accept the net 
proceeds from the sale of the property in full satisfaction of the total due on the first 
mortgage.”  RAO, supra note 4, § 2.8.11.2. 
 70. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM: HANDBOOK 
FOR SERVICERS OF NON-GSE MORTGAGES, VERSION 3.0 107–08 (Dec. 2, 2010) [hereinafter 
Handbook] (outlining the eligibility requirements for HAFA incentive payments). 
 71. Id. 
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that:  (1) the mortgage loan is secured by a one to four-unit property, one 
unit of which is the borrower’s principal residence; (2) the property is not 
condemned or vacant; (3) the unpaid balance of the mortgage loan for a 
one-unit property does not exceed $729,750;
72
 (4) the minimum monthly 
mortgage payment is greater than 31% of the borrower’s monthly gross 
income; and (5) the borrower has a documented financial hardship 
indicating an inability to make monthly mortgage payments.
73
  Under 
HAFA the borrower is required to deliver clear and marketable title.
74
  If all 
HAFA requirements are met, and a successful DIL transaction takes place, 
the borrower is entitled to up to $3000 for moving expenses, a servicer is 
entitled to a $1500 payment, and an investor is entitled to up to $2000 to be 
compensated for the release of subordinate liens.
75
  Originally, under a 
HAFA DIL transaction, a borrower was required to move out of the 
property within thirty days of the consummation of the deal.
76
  As of 
December 28, 2010, however, the Treasury enacted new rules that allow 
for DILs with deed-for-lease provisions and future repurchase 
agreements.
77
  These changes allow a borrower to enter into a DIL 
agreement with a servicer and either remain living on the property while 
paying rent to the servicer, or have the option to repurchase the property at 
some future time.
78
 
Likely owing to the very recent expansion of HAMP to include the 
HAFA program as well as the very narrow focus of the program, there has 
been little discussion of the program’s effectiveness or desirability in 
scholarly literature.
79
  There are, however, general discussions of HAMP 
and its effectiveness thus far.
80
  One such article,
81
 and testimony of a 
Treasury official,
82
 have noted that after the first year of HAMP the Federal 
 
 72. This limit increases incrementally with the number of units of the property.  If the 
property is two units, then the limit is $934,200; for three units it is $1,129,250; and for four 
units it is $1,403,400.  Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. RAO, supra note 4, § 2.8.11.1. 
 75. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM 
COMPENSATION MATRIX 4 (Nov. 9, 2010) [hereinafter COMPENSATION MATRIX]. 
 76. Handbook, supra note 70, at 116. 
 77. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVE 10–18 3 (Dec. 28, 2010). 
 78. Id. 
 79. As of the writing of this comment, a Westlaw search of law review and journal 
articles returns only two references to the HAFA program, both of which only mention the 
program in passing. 
 80. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from 
the Lackluster First Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 727 (2010) (describing the disappointing effects of HAMP’s first year). 
 81. Id. at 743. 
 82. Foreclosure Prevention: Is the Home Affordable Modification Program Preserving 
Homeownership?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th 
Cong. 1, 5 (Mar. 25, 2010) (statement of Herbert M. Allison, Assistant Secretary for 
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Government realized the need for an alternative program that offered short-
sales and DILs—hence the adoption of HAFA. 
Next, this comment will evaluate the HAFA program, both through an 
evaluation of the empirical data released by the government, and through 
the lens of the issues raised in the above sections.  This will be done first 
through an examination of the increase in use of DILs as a result of the 
implementation of the program, and then by looking at the advantages of 
using DILs for the borrower, the lender (or servicer), and the economy at 
large, as well as the potential hazards that their use creates.  The main flaws 
with the current government program, evaluated in this light, are that:  (1) 
the incentive payments are relatively small and unlikely to alter a borrower 
or lender’s behavior; (2) the “counseling” that is offered through the 
program is too weak to protect borrowers’ interests; and (3) the program’s 
eligibility requirements are too strict. 
The first flaw with the current incentive program for DILs is that the 
incentive payments are likely too small to significantly alter the behavior of 
either borrowers or lenders.  In January 2012, the average foreclosed home 
sold for over $182,000.
83
  The typical incentive payments for a servicer is 
$1500.
84
  This payment is less than one percent of the average foreclosure 
sale price of homes nationwide.  As a result, it would seem unlikely that it 
would play any substantial role in a servicer’s calculus in deciding whether 
or not to accept a DIL.  While this argument is certainly not airtight, there 
is also empirical evidence that indicates the ineffectiveness of the program.  
In particular, it can be shown empirically by comparing the Department of 
Treasury’s statistics for new DIL transactions before and after the 
enactment of HAFA.  The HAFA program was initiated in April 2010;
85
 
from September 30, 2009 to September 30, 2010 there was an increase in 
the use of DILs by 40.2%.
86
  While this, on its face, might be persuasive 
evidence of the efficacy of the program, the number must be considered in 
light of the overall number of completed foreclosures over the same period 
of time.  After all, the point of the DIL incentive program is to prevent 
 
Financial Stability, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury). 
 83. REALTYTRAC,  http://www.realtytrac.com (last visited, Jan. 26, 2012). 
 84. COMPENSATION MATRIX, supra note 75, at 4. 
 85. Problems of Mortgage Servicing from Modification to Foreclosure: Hearing before 
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (Dec. 1, 2010) (written 
testimony of Phyllis Caldwell, Chief of Homeownership Preservation Office). 
 86. See OCC and OTS Mortgage Metrics Report, supra note 16, at 42 (showing that 
there has been an increase from 118,606 to 186,854 completed foreclosures, and an increase 
from 1233 to 1729 new DIL actions in the time period from September 30, 2009 to 
September 30, 2010).  Note that this data does not look at every foreclosure and DIL action 
in the U.S., rather it addresses “residential mortgages serviced by national banks and 
federally regulated thrifts,” which comprise 64% of all outstanding mortgages in the U.S.  
Id. at 4. 
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foreclosures from taking place.  Thus, the true metric to consider in 
measuring the efficacy of the DIL incentive program is not the increase in 
the use of DILs, but rather the ratio between the number of DILs and the 
number of foreclosures.  In particular, during the time period from 
September 30, 2009 to a year later, the number of completed foreclosures 
rose 57.5%.
87
  This indicates a decrease in the ratio of DILs to completed 
foreclosures.
88
  If the program were to be presumed effective—that is, that 
the incentive program actually incentivized—one would expect a rise in the 
use of DILs to at least keep pace with the rise of completed foreclosures. 
The second flaw of the current program is that it does not offer 
sufficient representation for borrowers.  The main protection offered is 
counseling from HUD-approved housing counselors
89
 and access to the 
HOPE telephone hotline.
90
  While these services are undoubtedly valuable 
resources for many individuals, they fall short of the type of ideal 
representation discussed above.
91
  Specifically, the problems of an 
underrepresented borrower, who might have a defense to foreclosure or the 
ability to bargain for a more favorable deal, are conceivably still likely to 
occur even under the safeguards of HAFA’s current system.  There is a 
fundamental difference between the advice of a free counselor through a 
non-profit organization, and that of a paid attorney who represents a 
borrower’s interests in dealing with lenders.  Of course, from a normative 
standpoint it is always ideal to have all parties represented to as great an 
extent as possible; the real question is how this can be made feasible when 
a borrower has limited resources.  This comment’s proposed solution will 
be discussed in section V, below. 
The third flaw of the DIL program offered by HAFA is that it is too 
restrictive in its offering of incentives for DIL.  The HAFA program 
essentially creates a threshold requirement for participation in the program 
by requiring first that the borrower meet the eligibility for HAMP.
92
  While 
the strict requirements under HAMP might make sense for that program, 
they make less sense in the context of the HAFA program—in particular, 
the requirement that only individuals who can show they are both “in 
default or are in ‘imminent default’” and are in “financial hardship” are 
eligible for the program.
93
  These requirements were, in part, to ensure that 
the program would not introduce a moral hazard where borrowers would 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. To be precise, the ratio decreased from 1233 / 118,606 = 0.0104 to 1729 / 186,854 
= 0.0093. 
 89. Handbook, supra note 70, at 73. 
 90. Id. at 37. 
 91. See supra Part III.B. 
 92. See Handbook, supra note 70, at 106 (“The [HAFA] Program provides incentives . . 
. on an eligible loan under HAMP.”). 
 93. Braucher, supra note 80, at 732. 
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purposefully default in order to receive a favorable modification on their 
mortgage.
94
  The benefits of DILs, however, are not necessarily subject to 
the same concerns as modifications, and thus the threshold requirements for 
access to the government’s incentive program should not necessarily be the 
same.  With the economic crisis and the substantial drop in home values, as 
discussed above, it is conceivable that it would be economically sound 
policy to offer incentive programs for DILs to individuals, even if they 
cannot demonstrate financial hardship.  As an illustration, consider the 
example discussed above, modified slightly.
95
  In this instance, we still 
assume an individual owes $300,000 on a recourse mortgage secured by a 
home worth $290,000, but we now assume that the borrower only expects 
the foreclosure process to cost $10,000.  Now further assume that the 
lender believes it has a 50% chance of collecting on a deficiency judgment.  
And finally, assume that the borrower is not in as deep financial hardship 
as is necessary to meet the requirements of either the HAMP or HAFA 
program, and is therefore not eligible for them.  The question to be asked is 
whether it would be sound policy to incentivize the parties to enter a DIL 
transaction. 
In this particular situation, the borrower may very well have incentive 
to offer a DIL to the lender,
96
 but a lender will have little incentive to 
accept one.
97
  Thus, while the benefit to a lender individually will be 
minimal, the point to consider is the cost and gain from offering an 
incentive to them to enter into such an agreement.  Discussed in detail 
above, the cost of foreclosure to communities, local governments, state 
court systems, area housing and the broader economy can be substantial.
98
  
In this marginal example, any non-trivial incentive payment to the parties 
would be sufficient to alter their behavior.  In this particular instance, an 
extension of the current incentive program—i.e., payments of between 
$1500 and $3000
99
—to include a circumstance such as this, might very 
well be sufficient to incentivize the parties to enter into a DIL transaction.  
Further, considering the costs of foreclosure, a payment totaling less than a 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. See supra Part III.E. 
 96. If a lender accepts the DIL, the borrower will be free from the debt for which she 
would otherwise be accountable. 
 97. The reason the lender will have little incentive to accept a DIL is because under 
either situation the lender expects to walk away with $290,000.  Using a DIL transaction, 
the $290,000 home would be handed over to the lender.  By foreclosing on the home, the 
lender will sell it for $290,000, have costs of $10,000, and have a 50% of collecting on a 
$20,000 deficiency judgment.  Thus, under the foreclosure route, the lender will also expect 
to walk away with (290,000 – 10,000 + (0.5   20,000)) = $290,000.  
 98. See supra Parts III.C–D. 
 99. See COMPENSATION MATRIX, supra note 75 (setting out details of current HAMP 
incentives). 
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few thousand dollars would likely be far less than the damages mitigated 
by the payment.  There are indeed problems with expanding a DIL 
incentive program to include homeowners who are not in financial trouble; 
for example, the fear that the program might incentivize individuals, who 
might otherwise stay in their home, to default.  In fact, this is one such fear 
that shaped the original HAMP guidelines and requirements.
100
  This 
concern will be addressed in the proposed changes section, below. 
V.  PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE HAFA PROGRAM 
Paralleling the three main criticisms of the HAFA program outlined in 
the section above, this comment proposes three alterations to the program 
in order to (1) better meet its stated goals, (2) better protect homeowners 
and their interests, and (3) expand the program in order to further aid in the 
economic and housing recoveries. 
The first, and primary, change would be to increase the incentive 
payments to borrowers and lenders.  While this comment does not intend to 
propose an ideal number for the incentive payments, it seems relatively 
clear that they are insufficient in their current form.  With the payments 
being such a small proportion of the possible sale price at foreclosure, in 
their current form they are only likely to be a secondary consideration for 
most borrowers and lenders. 
The second proposed change would be to allocate some portion of the 
borrower’s increased incentive payment for legal services in the aid of 
completing a DIL transaction.  This would ensure that the borrower is fully 
informed and represented in the transaction, that he is not abandoning a 
valid defense to foreclosure, that there are no inequitable information 
asymmetries during the bargaining process, and that the transaction is 
generally in the borrower’s best interest.  Indeed, the program in its current 
form offers incentive payments that must be used for moving expenses.  
And while moving is a necessary aspect of these transactions, the same 
money allocated for those purposes could very well be more useful for 
borrowers if all or part of it were allocable to legal representation.  Legal 
representation, after all, has the potential to increase the borrower’s long-
term wealth if the alternative is to enter into an unfavorable deal with a 
lender. 
At least one state agrees that legal representation for individuals going 
through foreclosure is a necessity.  New York has recently outlined a plan 
to ensure that foreclosure defendants have legal representation.
101
  The 
rationale behind the move is both to further help people to stay in their 
 
 100. Braucher, supra note 80, at 732 (“[HAMP] eschewed steps that . . . might have 
created a moral hazard by encouraging underwater debtors to default.”). 
 101. Streitfeld, supra note 37. 
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homes, and to effectively deal with the influx of foreclosure cases.
102
  This 
is the same reasoning that supports changing HAFA’s compensation (in 
whole or in part) from moving expenses to legal aid.  Moreover, unlike the 
New York program, additional appropriation would not be necessary in 
order to effectuate this change in the program.  Compensation money for 
moving expenses already exists and is available; this money could simply 
be used to pay legal counsel, rather than moving companies, or be divided 
in some way between them. 
Finally, the third proposed change would be to loosen the restrictions 
on the availability of the program.  In particular, the proposed change 
would loosen the financial hardship requirement.
103
  As mentioned earlier, 
the most glaring problem with reducing or eliminating the financial 
hardship requirement is the moral hazard that might be created by 
incentivizing underwater debtors to default on their mortgages.  Thus, this 
comment proposes that incentive payments be allowed for borrowers who 
do not meet the financial hardship requirement, but that the payments are 
modified depending on certain criteria.  The concept would be to allow 
higher payments for those who are more likely to default and lower for 
those who are less likely to do so.  This determination could be made based 
on two criteria:  (1) the financial position of the borrowers, and (2) the 
degree to which the mortgage loan is underwater.  That is, if an individual 
is in a financially sound position, and their mortgage loan is not deep 
underwater, there is very little likelihood of their default.  Such individuals 
would thus not be entitled to much, if any, incentive payment.  However, 
an individual who is in financial distress and whose loan is deep 
underwater would have a high probability of defaulting.  Thus, such an 
individual would be entitled to a higher incentive payment to enter into a 
DIL transaction.  In this way, the moral hazard problem is minimized.  If 
someone is unlikely to default on their loan, then there will be little 
incentive for them to do so. 
This expansion of eligibility could also aid in the industry’s recovery 
from the foreclosure controversy.  Allowing incentive payments for DILs 
might encourage otherwise skeptical lenders to accept DILs in areas where 
foreclosures have been frozen.
104
  This could allow for those losses on the 
lenders’ books to be realized earlier, benefiting the broader economy.
105
  In 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Handbook, supra note 70, at 107 (“A borrower has documented a financial 
hardship and represented that he or she does not have sufficient liquid assets to make the 
monthly mortgage payments.”). 
 104. See supra Part II.C. 
 105. See Daniel Alpert, Op-Ed., Why Own When You Can Lease, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 
2009 (arguing, in part, that in order “[t]o put the bubble behind us, we need to place 
mortgage lenders on a path to settling up with underwater homeowners”). 
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addition, an expansion of the program would also aid in clearing up state 
court dockets.
106
 
It is important to note that the proposed expansion would not do away 
with the home value ceilings that are currently part of the HAMP and 
HAFA programs, nor would it be meant to serve as a subsidy to otherwise 
financially healthy individuals to abandon their home to foreclosure.  This 
comment does not argue that taxpayer money should be used to pay 
wealthy people to abandon, say, multi-million dollar homes when the 
mortgages on those homes become burdensome.  The expanded program 
suggested would remain limited to people who:  (1) are financially troubled 
(just with looser restrictions than the current program); (2) own homes that 
have values less than the current HAMP restrictions; and (3) own homes 
that have values less than what is owed on the mortgage. 
VI.  REMAINING PROBLEMS 
This comment is not arguing that DILs can serve as the solution for 
the economic and mortgage crises.  In fact, the thrust of the argument is 
that the use and incentivization of DILs can only, in certain instances, 
mitigate some of the damage.
107
  Most important is to note that DILs can be 
beneficial only in certain instances.  There are a variety of situations in 
which DILs either are not practical or would not be beneficial.  For 
instance, if there is equity in the property or a defense to foreclosure, DIL 
should certainly not be used.  Furthermore, if a timely short-sale can be 
made and agreed to by the parties, such a transaction would likely be a 
better option than a DIL.  And, even in instances where a DIL might seem 
beneficial, lenders may still resist acceptance of a deed because (among 
other reasons) they do not want the asset on their books or the cost of 
upkeep of the property if they retain it. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The housing crisis has revealed a variety of defects in the mortgage 
lending industry—many of which could have, and should have, been 
remedied prior to the housing market’s rapid decline.  Nevertheless, these 
defects were quite obviously not cured, and the full extent of their negative 
impact on the future of the U.S. housing market remains to be fully 
discovered.  There are, however, measures that have been taken to 
minimize the negative impact of those defects, including the Federal 
 
 106. See supra Part III.C. 
 107. This is a sentiment with which the Federal Government most likely agrees, having 
enacted the HAFA program to begin with.  See also Foreclosure Prevention, supra note 82, 
at 8 (“HAFA . . . will help to prevent costly foreclosures”). 
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Government’s HAMP and HAFA programs.  Yet, even these programs are 
not entirely without their own defects.  This comment argues that one 
particular device, DILs, can be utilized to a greater extent to aid in the 
housing market’s recovery.  The current HAFA program offers too little, in 
terms of both compensation and protection, and is offered to too small of a 
subset of individuals.  The program should be expanded to aid the market 
in its recovery by decreasing the number of foreclosure actions and 
incentivizing lenders to settle their underwater loans.  The DIL device is by 
no means a cure-all for the woes of the U.S. economy and housing market, 
but it is an important tool that should be utilized to a greater extent. 
 
